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Article 4

Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare
Benefits
By MarjorieE. Kornhauser*

When it comes to the topic of wealth and income inequality,
Americans seemingly agree on nothing other than its existence.1 They
even differ as to whether the inequality is bad. 2 Those who agree it is
bad disagree about what, if anything, should be done about it. Those
who agree something should be done disagree about whether the
government should do it. Those who agree the government should do
something disagree about what should be done, and how. Should the
government act through the tax code, direct expenditures, or a
combination of the two?
These are important questions; they involve not just economic issues
but social, moral, and critical political questions about the meaning of
American democracy. Many people have pondered these issues and

written about them. Yet no matter how cogent the arguments either for
or against equality, they have changed few people's minds. This failure
* © Marjorie E. Kornhauser 2008. Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University.
1. Although they agree that inequality exists, not everyone agrees that it has increased over the
past several decades. In general, however, statistics show that inequality has increased in the past
two decades, with the richest one percent of Americans having very large increases in average
incomes. See, e.g., JARED BERNSTEIN, ELIZABETH McNICHOL & ANDREW NICHOLAS, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF INCOME
TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-08sfp.pdf (finding that income inequality
has grown in most parts of the country since the late 1980s); Thomas L. Hungerford, Income
Inequality and the U.S. Tax System, 117 TAx NOTES 465, 465-78 (2007); Frank Levy & Peter
Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13106, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 13106 (discussing
the widening income inequality as shaped by economic institutions). Income inequality may have
reached levels not seen since 1929. See Jesse Drucker, Richest Americans See Their Income
Share Grow, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2008, at A3 (examining IRS data from 2006).
2. There is, however, growing evidence that inequality has negative economic, social, and
political consequences. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Neckerman & Florencia Torche, Inequality: Causes
and Consequences,33 ANN. REV. Soc. 335, 340-41 (2007) (finding that economic inequality has
negatively impacted health, education, crime and incarceration, social relations, and politics);
Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality 2-28 (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working
Paper No. 370, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=1028874 (arguing that income
inequality increases crime, political corruption, and in certain circumstances, constrains growth).
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rate is not caused by the quality of arguments. Rather, it stems from the
fact that people's minds are not very susceptible to reason on these

issues. Their opinions result from differing worldviews that,3 being

affectively based, are not very responsive to factual information.
Despite the extent of the disagreement and its intractable nature, the
state constantly enacts laws, including tax laws, whose distributional
burdens affect wealth/income inequality. Even when the goal is simply

to raise revenue, basic choices about the tax base, rate, and taxable unit
inevitably alter tax burdens. Tax provisions enacted to implement
social and economic policies increase the distributional impact of the
tax system, although the effects are not always intentional. Some
people believe that certain programs are deliberately placed in the tax
laws precisely to hide distributive effects.
Current United States federal policy intentionally uses the tax system
to redistribute income to the poor because, according to conventional
wisdom, the tax system is superior to direct benefits for both political
and economic reasons. A refundable tax credit has become social
policy's "magic bullet." 4 Thus, the largest federal antipoverty program
for working families in existence today is the Earned Income Tax Credit

(EITC). 5 The economic rationale for indirect tax benefits in lieu of
direct welfare is simply that they are more efficient. 6 The political
3. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 149, 150-51, 163 (2006).
4. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM. U.
L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2007) (characterizing a common view of credits). Some have gone so far as
to say that all welfare programs should be delivered via the tax system in the form of refundable
credits. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 131-35 (2006).
5. I.R.C. § 32 (2000 & West Supp. 2008), amended by Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 4002(b), 122 Stat. 1095, and Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4002(b), 122
Stat. 1857; STEVE HOLT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30:
WHAT WE KNOW 1 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/
2006/02childrenfamilies-holt/20060209-Holt.pdf.
6. See Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821
(2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Tax
Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1824
(2006). But see Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal
Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution:A Response to Kaplow and Shavell, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1125, 1128-29 (2004); Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules As Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 797-800 (2000); Nancy Staudt,
Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1197, 1226-27, 1230-39 (2006)
(arguing that since the causes of poverty are unclear, it may be efficient to have both tax and
direct spending programs because each may reach a different causation theory). If the tax system
is the appropriate delivery mechanism, then refundable credits are the best means to accomplish
the goal. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and
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rationale rests on the belief that the public does not support
governmental provision of welfare benefits because these benefits
violate basic American tenets of individualism, self-reliance, autonomy,
and (negative) liberty, all of which profoundly limit the scope of
legitimate state action. Consequently, most Americans view welfare as
an unjust taking from individuals that which they deserve (having
earned it by their own efforts) and a wrongful redistribution to others.
The redistribution is wrong regardless of who receives it. Either the
recipient is undeserving because he is responsible for his poverty
through a failure to act in a responsible, self-reliant manner, or the
recipient is deserving but the redistribution will create dependency
instead of self-reliance.
Given these attitudes, conventional wisdom maintains that welfare
expenditures via the tax system can garner wider political support than
traditional welfare because they are more consistent with traditional
American history, values, and beliefs. Benefits are less objectionable
when delivered through the tax system because they are viewed less as
handouts than direct spending, especially if they target the "deserving"
the tax
poor and provide economic incentives to them. Moreover,
7
system conveniently camouflages tax welfare benefits.
A recent incident in the 2008 presidential primary campaign seems to
support conventional wisdom. In September 2007, Senator Hillary
Clinton suggested that every baby receive a $5000 bond from the
government which could be spent on education when the child reached
age eighteen. 8 The response to this proposal was so negative that she
quickly dropped it. However, despite the negative reaction, Americans

Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 42-56 (2006)
(arguing that refundable tax credits minimize administrative costs and distribute income fairly);
FORMAN, supra note 4, at 131-35.
7. See Ventry, supra note 4, at 1269. Another factor in the increased use of tax expenditures
in the past decades has as much to do with trust as ideology. Christopher Howard states that in
the "last decades of the twentieth" century, public support for government spending remained
high, but as trust in government fell (and politicians exploited that trust), more "indirect tools of
social welfare," such as tax expenditures, were needed to pass social legislation. CHRISTOPHER
HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL

POLICY 122-23 (2007).
8. See Voters Reject Clinton Baby Bond Proposal by 2-to-I Margin, RASMUSSEN REP., Oct. 1,
2007, http://rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/current-events/general-current-events
/votersrejectclinton-baby-bond-proposal-by_2_to_ 1-margin (stating that sixty percent of
"America's Likely Voters" disapprove); Posting of Gerald Prante to Tax Policy Blog, Hillary
"Baby Bond" Is Essentially Already Here,
Clinton's Proposal for $5,000
http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/22650.htm (Oct. 3, 2007) (criticizing the $5,000 bond

proposal for newborns).
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support an existing program9 that actually gives many parents more
money: the Child Tax Credit.
Why does the American public react so differently to two policies
with the same result? Recent cognitive behavior literature helps solve
the puzzle. The two policies present or "frame" the goal differently.
Each frame appeals to different worldviews and each activates different
norms and other cognitive processes. The Child Tax Credit is more
congruent with the assumedly dominant view in America: one that
favors individualism, autonomy, and self-reliance, and opposes
excessive state intervention, especially redistributive state action that
interferes with market-based results. The direct payment proposal
contradicts this view because it is visible government action that
appears to be a "handout" in contradiction to the American credo of
self-reliance.
Although reaction to the baby bond proposal appears to vindicate
conventional wisdom, closer examination reveals the contrary. Welfare
tax benefits are not as economically efficient or as broadly supported as
commonly believed. Indeed, certain direct spending programs actually
can be more efficient and generate more public support. From an
economic standpoint, even the best type of tax welfare benefitsrefundable tax credits-have efficiency problems. In the short term,
they create work disincentives during phase-outs, and in the long term
they cannot provide the non-monetary assistance people often need.
More importantly, they do not properly address long-term underlying
causes of poverty and inequality.
From a political standpoint, tax welfare benefits have cognitive
disadvantages. Using the tax system to deliver welfare ultimately
presents welfare in a negative frame, which divides people and narrows
public support for welfare. It emphasizes individualistic/hierarchic
worldviews and self-interested norms, activates negative attitudes
regarding tax, the poor, and welfare, and creates an uneven playing field
by disguising welfare benefits the non-poor receive while leaving those
the poor receive visible. In contrast, direct expenditures, especially
universal
human
capital
programs,
can
activate
communitarian/egalitarian worldviews and norms of cooperation and
altruism, as well as moderate anti-tax attitudes by removing the direct
connection between tax and welfare that exists when the tax system is
9. See Prante, supra note 8 (pointing out that a $1000 credit for every child under 17 already
exists in the form of the Child Tax Credit). Gerald Prante calculates that "[w]hen [a] child turns
18, the family will have saved over $28,000 (assuming a five percent interest rate) [as a result of
the Child Tax Credit]. On the other hand, a $5,000 bond only turns out to be around $12,000
over that same time period." Id.
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the delivery mechanism. Direct expenditures diminish anti-welfare
sentiment by leveling the playing field, making welfare benefits for the
poor and non-poor equally visible. Reframed as direct expendituresespecially universal programs to develop human capital-welfare
spending furthers the norm of equal opportunity, which most Americans
accept regardless of their worldviews; this encourages a sense of
cohesion and support.
The current reliance on tax expenditures to deliver welfare decreases
the potential of welfare spending to spur economic growth and to gain
political support. Just as financial investment portfolios must be
constantly rebalanced to achieve optimum results, so too must
investments in human capital. The time has arrived for the government
to rebalance its mixture of direct and indirect spending on human capital
(i.e., welfare).
Parts I and II examine
This Article proceeds as follows. 10
support
for welfare. Part I
American
regarding
conventional wisdom
sets the political debate about welfare and inequality within the context
It suggests that conventional wisdom
of opposing worldviews.
underestimates the actual amount of support for direct welfare because
it both overstates the dominance of the worldviews that oppose it and
understates the strength of worldviews that support redistribution.
Indeed, evidence suggests much stronger support for direct welfare than
commonly believed. Part II continues the discussion of welfare within
the framework of cognitive behavior. The placement of welfare
benefits in the tax system triggers cognitive processes that are inimical
to redistribution; in contrast, properly devised direct expenditures can
suppress these processes and activate more positive ones that would
generate more support for welfare than conventional wisdom suggests.
Part III briefly examines the economic arguments favoring tax welfare
benefits. The first section illustrates some of the economic problems
with tax benefits, using the EITC and education credits as examples.
The second portion explores the fallacy of the equity-efficiency
tradeoff. Part III's final section briefly discusses efficiency issues with
direct expenditures. Part IV provides a brief summary of the potential
advantages of reframing certain welfare benefits as direct spending. It
concludes by describing two hybrid tax/direct expenditure programs
10. This Article's scope is narrow. It is not a disquisition on welfare, poverty, or inequality; it
does not enter the rich debate about the nature and merit of tax expenditures, nor re-examine tax
expenditures generally, nor argue that there should not be any. It does not deny that taxation
must be a consideration when examining wealth/income disparities since basic choices about
taxation (e.g., base, rate, taxable unit) inevitably affect distribution. It also does not deny that
specific tax expenditures, such as the EITC can-and have-helped poor individuals.
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that might optimize efficiency and popular support by reframing
welfare.
I. WORLDVIEWS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WELFARE

Worldviews are primarily unconscious and affectively-based
cognitive systems of beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions. They serve as
a framework for an individual's interaction with her surroundings,
including other people and society.Il Since they are the filters through
which a person views the world-how it is and how it should be-they
profoundly influence peoples' attitudes, including opinions about tax
and welfare. People fall along a continuum of two basic worldviews:
the first concerns the relationship of the individual to the group
(individualistic versus communitarian orientation); the second concerns
the nature of society (hierarchical versus egalitarian). 12

Conventional wisdom holds that the tax system is the superior
delivery mechanism for welfare because it better comports with
predominant American worldviews than direct spending. On the first
continuum (the relationship of the individual to the group), Americans
are seen as extremely individualistic. American democracy rests on the
primacy of the individual and the concomitant belief in negative liberty,
which protects the individual from governmental infringement on his

autonomy. Since Americans treasure individualism, self-reliance, and
independence, they value the free market as the mechanism that best
allows the individual to flourish. They do not support wealth and

income redistribution, which encourages dependency by shifting
11. There is no universal definition, but the following quote captures the essence of
worldviews:
A worldview is a way of describing the universe and life within it, both in terms of
what is and what ought to be. A given worldview is a set of beliefs that includes
limiting statements and assumptions regarding what exists and what does not (either in
actuality, or in principle), what objects or experiences are good or bad, and what
objectives, behaviors, and relationships are desirable or undesirable. A worldview
defines what can be known or done in the world, and how it can be known or done. In
addition to defining what goals can be sought in life, a worldview defines what goals
should be pursued. Worldviews include assumptions that may be unproven, and even
unprovable, but these assumptions are superordinate, in that they provide the epistemic
and ontological foundations for other beliefs within a belief system.
Mark Koltko-Rivera, The Psychology of Worldviews, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 3, 4 (2004). See also

Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 122 (2007) (discussing
how cultural preferences are general views about how society should be organized).
12. Kahan, supra note II, at 122-23 (referring to the anthropologist Mary Douglas's basic
classifications); see also Daniel W. Barrett et al., Individual Differences in the Motivation to
Comply Across Cultures: The Impact of Social Obligation, 37 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 19-31 (2004); Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, at 153-54 (citing MARY DOUGLAS
& AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982)).
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responsibility from the individual to the state and diminishes freedom
by taking from individuals a portion of the just rewards they received
for their efforts in the market economy. Moreover, any redistribution to
decrease inequality will ultimately harm the very people redistribution
attempts to aid because it will decrease economic efficiency, which
fuels economic growth that benefits everyone. In other words, a "rising
tide lifts all boats."
On the second continuum-views on the nature of society-the
stereotypical American worldview is an egalitarian one. However,
Americans are actually hierarchists, if hierarchy is defined by merit
instead of the usual definition using status. This Article uses the term
"hierarchist" in this sense of merit hierarchy, 13 unless otherwise stated.
Belief in merit hierarchy flows from the belief in individual freedom
and autonomy, which give the individual the ability to affect his fate.
Market distributions are fair because they are the product of individual
efforts and not status or mere (bad) luck. Consequently, wealth and
income inequality is fair 14 because it results from individual meriteffort and talent-not status or luck. It follows, then, that redistribution
is wrong because it unjustly takes from an individual that which
properly belongs to him, thereby limiting freedom and undercutting
merit-based hierarchy.
The prevailing American worldviews are not wrong; they are,
however, incomplete. As I have argued elsewhere, 15 many Americans
hold opposing (merit) egalitarian and communitarian views that favor
reducing inequality and supporting governmental programs, including
aid to the poor, as a means to do so. These views, like the
individualistic/hierarchic ones, are also based on a foundational
13. Under classic or status hierarchy, hierarchists "support a relatively hierarchical social
order, in which goods, opportunities, offices, and obligations are distributed on the basis of
largely fixed social attributes, such as gender, ethnicity, lineage, and class." Kahan, supra note
11, at 122-23.
14. Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Inequality and Happiness: Are
Europeansand Americans Different?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2009, 2018-26 (2004) (theorizing that
less unhappiness with inequality is correlated with a belief in mobility). See also FREDERICK
VAN DER PLOEG, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, ARE THE WELFARE STATE AND
DISTRIBUTION REALLY THAT BAD FOR THE ECONOMY? EFFECTS OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM,

CONSUMER
RIVALRY
AND
SECOND
BEST
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4918.asp (discussing how democratic countries where people
believe success depends on connections and luck induce political support for high tax rates and
generous welfare states).
15. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1740-43 (2005). See also James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity:
A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) (arguing that creating equal
opportunity is the principal goal of a just government and the tax system should be designed to do
so).
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principle of the nation: equality, especially equality of opportunity.
Since most people do not uniformly hold the same view on every issue,
even individualists and/or hierarchists sometimes see the world through
a more egalitarian prism. This is especially true because the egalitarian
view is so deeply rooted in American tradition.
In fact, egalitarianism-especially in the form of the concept of equal
opportunity-is essential to individualists/hierarchists as well as
communitarian/egalitarians. Americans tolerate inequality more than
many other developed countries do because they believe in economic
(and social) mobility; that each American has a chance of bettering
himself. 16 Without equal opportunity, the agency of the individual is
diminished, market economy results become suspect and merit
hierarchy turns into a sham. If there is no economic mobility, then
distribution is a result of one's status (who one's parents are) and not
one's merit.
Empirical evidence undermines the assumptions about the dominance
of individualistic/hierarchic views in America and indicates that
concern about inequality and the degree of support for welfare is
underestimated. The American public, for example, believes by a
strong margin that the government has responsibilities regarding basic
health care, decent housing, and access to college. Almost half,
according to some studies, even believe that the government should
reduce the income gap between rich and poor. 17
Determining the exact amount of support for welfare is a complicated
task well beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum, there are
three basic difficulties: defining the term "welfare," measuring the
amount of welfare, 18 and discerning the degree of public support. This
section next briefly discusses the first and last issues.

16. See ISABEL SAWHILL & JOHN E. MORTON, ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT, ECONOMIC
MOBILITY:
IS
THE
AMERICAN
DREAM
ALIVE
AND
WELL?
3
(2007),

http://www.economicmobility.org/ assets/pdfs/EMPAmericanDream.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2008).
17. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 113 (stating that over eighty percent of the public supports
these government responsibilities based on the data set of the International Social Survey
Program, Role of Government II1 (1996), available at http://www.issp.org). The Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press has found in surveys dating to 1987 that, on average, twothirds of Americans believed that the government should "take care of people who can't take care
of themselves" and that the "government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place
to sleep."
18. This problem is not limited to simply choosing the proper measurement tool. Rather, it
also involves many of the cognitive issues, such as framing, discussed infra in Part H1. For
example, the results of a survey question are influenced by how the question is posed (e.g., in the
positive or negative) and even the order of questions.
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Americans generally define welfare narrowly to mean helping the
poor, what this Article labels "poor" welfare. They tend not to call
government spending "welfare" when it benefits middle and upperincome individuals or corporations, 19 what this Article labels "general"
welfare. For example, low-income housing is seen as welfare, but
subsidizing home ownership for the middle class is not. Food stamps
are welfare, but low tuition at state-funded college attended by middleclass children is not. Cognitive behavior issues, such as framing and
schemas, play a large role in the failure to identify "general" welfare as
welfare, as discussed in Part II.
Americans support both types of welfare more than commonly
believed. 20 The current size of the American welfare state offers ample
support for this. Although most people believe the American welfare
state is stingy and small relative to other developed countries, it is
actually much larger than believed in both absolute and relative terms.
The misperception about the size of the American welfare state occurs
in large part because much of American welfare is not delivered in the
traditional form of direct welfare payments, as is the case in other
countries such as Norway or Sweden. In the United States, a large
amount of welfare is delivered through the tax (and regulatory) systems,
which the public generally does not consider welfare. 2 1 Regulations
(statutory or administrative) are generally discussed in terms of their
efficiency but not their distributive effects.
For example, a law
concerning cattle damage to farmers' crops will be efficient regardless
of who bears the liability, but the wealth distribution will be very
different.
The middle and upper classes receive a large share of government
benefits through hidden tax expenditures. The Child and Dependent
Care Tax Credit, for example, largely benefits higher-income families
while direct subsidy programs that benefit low-income families are

19. The term "corporate welfare," however, is used by experts and some politicians in
reference to tax preferences for corporations. Libertarians criticize these tax expenditures to
corporations just as they criticize federal programs that help the poor. See, e.g., STEPHEN
SLIVINSKI, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, THE CORPORATE WELFARE STATE: HOW THE
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIZES
U.S.
BUSINESSES
(2007),
available at
http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?pubjid=8230.
20. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 122-23; MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE:
RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 2 (2000) ("The American public
consistently expresses a desire for more government effort, and higher levels of spending, for
almost every aspect of the welfare state.").
21. HOWARD, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that the U.S. system "rel[ies] less on social insurance
and more on tax expenditures, loan guarantees, and social regulation than welfare states

elsewhere").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

underfunded. 22 The amount the federal government indirectly spends

on housing via the home mortgage interest deduction, as another
example, dwarfs that spent directly and indirectly on low-income

housing, with most of those tax benefits helping higher income
taxpayers since lower income taxpayers do not itemize. 2 3 A recent
study by the Economic Mobility Project, sponsored by the Pew
Charitable Trusts, reports that in 2006 approximately seventy-two
percent of federal spending to further economic mobility (e.g., through

housing supports) went to middle- and higher-income individuals, in
comparison to twenty-eight percent to lower- and moderate-income
individuals. 24 Much of that, according to David Cay Johnston, was
25
spent via tax expenditures.

22. LEONARD E. BURMAN, ELAINE MAAG & JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX POLICY CTR., TAX
SUBSIDIES TO HELP LOW-INCOME FAMILIES PAY FOR CHILD CARE 14 (2005), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/411190_TPCDiscussionPaper_- 23.pdf.
23. William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1174-75, 1178 (2007). See also
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2009, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, 289 tbl.19-1 (2008),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/spec.pdf (estimates of total
income tax expenditures). Housing tax expenditures for the better off far exceed those for the
poor. Id. For example, for 2007, the home mortgage interest deduction exceeded eighty-four
billion dollars while the credit for low income housing was only five billion dollars. Id.
24. ADAM CARASSO, GILLIAN REYNOLDS & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, ECONOMIC MOBILITY
PROJECT, How MUCH DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPEND TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC
MOBILITY AND FOR WHOM? 3 (2008), http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/
PEWEMP_ FEDERALSPENDING.pdf. Approximately twenty-eight percent of the benefits
are in the form of direct expenditures, whereas approximately seventy-two percent are tax
expenditures. Id. Interestingly, this mirrors the percentage that benefits middle/higher income
individuals. Id. The researchers divided federal spending into ten basic categories:
(1) employer work subsidies, such as 401(k) and healthcare; (2) home ownership; (3)
savings/investments,
such as dividends; (4) education/training; (5) child
health/nutrition; (6) work support, such as EITC; (7) other child services, such as foster
care; (8) business incentives/development; (9) citizenship, such as refugee assistance;
and (10) equal opportunity services, such as minority business development.
Id. at2.
25. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: HOW THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS ENRICH
THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (AND STICK YOU WITH THE BILL) 7-8, 23 (2007)
(arguing that the rich have "captured" the government, so much so that the subsidy often
outweighs the economic benefits it produces). There is no uniform definition of tax expenditures,
which is, in fact, one of the major criticisms of the concept. The Treasury and the Joint
Committee on Taxation, for example, differ on several provisions. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
2007-2011, at 2, 18 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-3-07.pdf.
Employer health contributions, employer retirement contributions, and home mortgage interest
deductions are some of the largest expenditures. Id. at 2-5. See also Dustin Stamper, Capital
Gains and Dividend Rate Cut Is Biggest Tax Expenditure, 117 TAX NOTES 18, 18 (2007). The
largest tax expenditure is now the reduced rates for dividends and long term capital gains, income
that goes primarily to higher income taxpayers. Id.
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Clearly, then, the general public likes welfare spending. But does it
like it only when it helps them (and people like them) and not people
unlike them (the poor)? An individualist/hierarchic worldview that
stresses self-interest over self-reliance would argue yes, and to some
extent it is no doubt true. However, because the majority of programs
are framed as tax expenditures or regulations, many people are unaware
that the benefits flow to them and not everyone. Thus, the current
distribution of benefits may not be their real preferences since they are
unaware of the true distributive effects.
More direct evidence exists that the public supports welfare benefits
for the poor, especially certain benefits such as education and health
care. Polls consistently show strong support for the proposition that
government should be involved in the provision of health and education,
even if increasing benefits means increasing taxes or eliminating tax
cuts. 26 These findings are not surprising. The benefits are investments
in human capital, which is necessary for expressing autonomy and
equality of opportunity-concepts that both individualistic/hierarchic
and communitarian/egalitarian people support.
Conventional wisdom holds that the public supports general welfare
(such as Social Security) more than poor welfare (e.g., food stamps).
However, the expansion of programs targeting the poor-whether
indirect (EITC) or direct (Medicaid)-suggests broader support for poor
welfare than commonly believed. 27 A partial explanation for this strong
support may be that these programs involve positive worldviews and
norms. The Earned Income Tax Credit's goal, for example, is to help
only the "deserving" poor who are trying to be self sufficient and only
need temporary assistance until they are. Indeed, one of the attractions
of the EITC is that people view it as an effective means of rising out of
poverty and dependency to self-sufficiency. Medicaid also involves the
26. See, e.g., Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll, Public Pessimistic on the Economy: Most
Pick Democrats Over Republicans on Health Care Reform, Oct. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.latimes.com/media/acrobat/2007-10133450977.pdf.
Sixty percent of respondents
were willing to "repeal some of Bush's tax cuts in order to help pay for a health care program that
insures all Americans." Id. at 5, 11. Thirty-one percent were not willing to repeal tax cuts, eight
percent were not sure, and one percent refused to answer. Id. at 11. Interestingly, women were

more willing than men (63% v. 58%) to repeal cuts. Id. See also National Annenberg Election
Survey (question 10), Jan. 23, 2004 (2004 poll found that a majority of respondents believed the
federal government should spend more money on public elementary and secondary schooling
(55% of Republicans and 81% of Democrats)). See also infra notes 34-36. Empirical studies
have well-known problems in that how a question is presented can affect the results (e.g., the
order of questions; positive or negative phrasing). However, these problems are less severe

regarding welfare because many of the questions have been asked repeatedly, using the same
phrasing, over many years.
27.

See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 7, at 41-43.
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deserving poor, who merit help because of illness, not sloth. Improving
their human capital (health) may help some beneficiaries achieve selfsufficiency, but many will never be able to work.
II. COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR: THE MERITS OF DIRECT EXPENDITURES AND
TAX EXPENDITURES AS WELFARE DELIVERY MECHANISMS
The welfare tax provisions discussed in this Article, being substitutes
for direct spending programs, fall within the numerous definitions of the
contested term "tax expenditures." A classic criticism of tax
expenditures is that they hide the fact that the government is spending
money.28
This argument rests primarily on the fact that tax
expenditures are less salient than direct expenditures; the public is less
aware of them, less interested in them, and more confused by them.
Consequently, the hidden nature of tax expenditures, the criticism
continues, makes it easier to enact, and maintain, policies that might not
weather scrutiny if enacted as direct spending programs. For example,
the public might not tolerate handing out dollars to every hedge fund
trader, but will not notice if these traders receive the money by means of
favorable tax treatment.
Conventional wisdom holds that this very quality of tax expenditures
-their invisibility-makes them valuable when it comes to poor
welfare. Hostility to poor welfare, the argument goes, makes it
politically impossible for Congress to enact a direct welfare program as
generous as the effects of the EITC. The tax system, in contrast,
29
provides enough "protective coloration" to make enactment possible.
Although it is generally true that welfare tax expenditures, like all tax
expenditures, camouflage government spending, many complexities and
28. A rich literature discusses the definition of tax expenditures and their merits. The
references in this note give just a small sample. For a classic discussion of tax expenditures, see
HOWARD, supra note 7; STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIELS, TAX EXPENDITURES
(1985); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168-71 (1993). For
current tax expenditures, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 25; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND COLLECTIONS (2008),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/apers/receipts.pdf. An early criticism of the
concept occurs in Boris 1. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969). The Joint Committee on Taxation recently reconsidered
tax expenditures and proposed a new method of analysis. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 2008),
availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/x-37-08.pdf.
29. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1903, 1910-11 (2005) (stating that the increased refundable
EITC in 1993 could occur only because Congress previously had come to view the EITC as
largely an offset for Social Security taxes).
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subtleties exist. Various cognitive processes affect responses to tax
expenditures.
The effects differ depending on whether the tax
expenditure is one for general welfare or poor welfare because cognitive
processes also influence a person's attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and
behavior regarding welfare and the poor. These cognitive processes
30
include the previously discussed worldviews, as well as schemas,
which serve as a type of mental "short cut," but are more specific. They
create "rules of thumb" that allow individuals to efficiently acquire,
store, organize, and retrieve knowledge; shortcuts influence the
perception of new data and one's reactions to it. Placing general
welfare benefits in the tax system activates cognitive processes that, on
balance, are favorable: either the benefit becomes invisible or is viewed
benignly. On the other hand, placing poor welfare benefits in the tax
system activates cognitive processes that not only do not completely
disguise their nature but also accentuate negative attitudes that
ultimately decrease support for poor welfare. This Article suggests that,
on balance, placing welfare benefits in the tax system has more negative
effects than positive, and that properly devised direct benefits might
elicit more public support for welfare.
People with individualistic/hierarchic worldviews perceive taxation
differently than those with communitarian/egalitarian ones. For the
latter, tax has some positive aspects because it is the mechanism to
achieve a society that benefits everyone. 3 1 For the former, however,
taxes have mainly negative aspects. For these people, most taxes are
not necessary because government has only a few legitimate functions.
This follows from the belief that the individual-not the governmentis responsible for his own situation. Moreover, taxes take property
(money) from those to whom it rightly belongs (the individuals who
have earned it) and therefore undermine their autonomy and their
freedom.

30. Schemas are relatively stable constellations of both affective and cognitive attitudes that
organize an individual's knowledge and by this organization influence the perception of new
information, affect, and values. See DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING
FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA 83 (1985). They are the product of various factors such as
cognitive processes (e.g., framing), psychological traits, prior experiences, social norms and
personal norms (i.e., social norms internalized by the individual). Since people have many
schemas, sometimes revolving around related topics, their attitudes and behaviors may appear
inconsistent when viewed in the aggregate. Sears & Citrin give the example of schema about race
that causes whites to oppose bussing but favor desegregation of schools. Id. at 77.
31. See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous quotation that taxation is the price of
civilization. Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S.
87, 100 (1927) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.").
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Even Americans with communitarian/egalitarian views have some
negative attitudes regarding taxation. This is true in part because, as
described in Part I, people often hold a mixture of views. It is also true,

however, because Americans connect low taxes not just to small
government but to freedom and liberty. Since the colonial era and
protests against British taxes, the struggle for freedom and

independence-for an "American" way of life-has been intertwined
with the struggle against taxes. It has always-been patriotic to be antitax, and politicians constantly remind Americans of that. 32 Taxation
thus triggers in most Americans, regardless of their worldviews, some
degree of an anti-tax schema.
In addition
to
the
anti-tax
schema,
the
"dominant"
individualist/hierarchic worldviews are consistent with two other

relevant schemas. The first is an anti-welfare schema; the other an antipoor schema. An anti-poor schema follows from the worldview that
poverty is the fault of the individual rather than the result of outside
32. Examples of this are numerous. See, e.g., President Reagan's Remarks During Tax Bill
Signing Ceremony (Oct. 22, 1986), reprinted in 33 TAx NOTES 413, 413 (1986). President
Reagan, on the signing of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stated that the Act's economic benefits
were less important than the fact that it returned America to its "first principles." Id. He called
the prior code "un-American," stating that "[t]hroughout history, the oppressive hand of
government has fallen most heavily on the economic life of the individuals. And, more often than
not, it is inflation and taxes that have undermined livelihoods and constrained their freedoms."
Id. See also President Ronald Reagan, 1988 Legislative and Administrative Message to Congress
(Jan. 25, 1988), reprinted in 33 TAx NOTES 413 (1986); 146 CONG. REC. H81 (Jan. 31, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Green). On January 31, 2000 the Speaker pro tempore, Representative Green
gave a speech that in many ways typifies the rhetorical links traditional conservatives make
between the proper nature of American government, liberty, and the role of taxes. Id. He began
with three critical premises: (1) since America is a republic and not a democracy, its government
must be one of limited powers "precisely defined and delegated by the people"; (2) the federal
nature of the republic severely limits the power of the central government; and (3) "[tlhe
American Revolutionaries clearly chose liberty over security .
Id. As a consequence of
I..."
these premises, he then asserted that liberty declines when the General Welfare clause is
interpreted, as it has been in recent decades, to expand the definition of welfare, and that taxation
is theft, "[s]ince government cannot create anything, it can only resort to using force to
redistribute the goods that energetic citizens produce." Id. Consequently, he concluded, high
taxes are inimical to liberty, prosperity, and property ownership. Id. George W. Bush, when
campaigning for the presidency, more succinctly, and with less rhetoric, summarized the
conservative position on government and taxes when he said that he supported tax cuts because:
"A government with unlimited funds soon becomes a government of unlimited reach." George
W. Bush, Speech to Greater Des Moines (Iowa) Chamber of Commerce (Dec. 1, 1999), quoted in
David Baumann, Taxes, 32 NAT'L J. 1047, 1047 (2000). Candidates for President in 2008
campaigned to lower taxes, and some, such as Ron Paul and Mike Huckabee, argued for the
elimination
of
the
income
tax.
See
Mike
Huckabee,
http://www.mikehuckabee.com?FuseAction=Issues.View&Issue-id=5 (last visited Oct. 16,
2008); Ron Paul, http://www.ronpaul2008.com/issues/debt-and-taxes/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2008);
Mitt Romney, http://www.ontheissues.org/MittRomney.htm#Tax-Reform (last visited Oct. 16,
2008).
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institutions or bad luck,3 3 and from the accompanying personal and
social norms of self-reliance, industriousness, and efficacy of work
effort. An anti-welfare schema follows from the view that it is the
responsibility of the individual-not the government-to improve his
situation, and from associated norms of self-reliance, independence, and
(negative) liberty. Moreover, traditional wisdom that increased equity
always comes at the expense of efficiency 34 contributes to the antiwelfare schema given the emphasis placed on the market and economic
growth as a measure of liberty and autonomy. Both schemas are so
deeply ingrained in the American psyche that even those with more
communitarian egalitarian views also adhere to them to some degree.
After all, most Americans, whatever their viewpoint, identify being
American with being middle class, not poor (and also not rich). 35
"Poor" welfare carries more negative baggage than general welfare; it
is burdened by an anti-poor schema, not just an anti-welfare one.
Moreover, antipathy to the poor and welfare is also fueled by historic
American racism: people are poor because they are idle and lazy, and
black people stereotypically are lazier than white. 3 6 Americans
consistently over-estimate the number of African-Americans who are on
welfare so that welfare is a "code" word for race, leading to a conflation
37
of anti-tax and anti-welfare sentiments.
The anti-tax, anti-poverty, anti-welfare schemas do not mean that
people are always anti-tax/anti-welfare, especially since these "anti"
attitudes are mediated by egalitarian/communitarian worldviews. In a
2005 poll, for example, more people believed that "circumstances
beyond control" were the cause of poverty rather than that the poor

33. See Claudia Biancotti & Giovanni D'Alessio, Inequality and Happiness 6 (Bank of Italy,
Working Paper Series, Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=10 11121 (citing R. Bdnabou & J. Tirole, Belief in a Just World and Redistributive
Politics, 121 Q. J. ECON. 699 (2006)).
34. ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 88-100 (1975). Part
III, infra, discusses this tradeoff.
35.

BRIAN W. CASHELL, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, WHO ARE THE "MIDDLE CLASS?" 3

(2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22627-20070320.pdf (citing a 2005 New
York Times survey in which 67% of subjects identified their social class as "middle or uppermiddle," while 35% were "working class" and 7% were "lower class"; only 1% identified
themselves as "upper" class).
36. See THOMAS B. EDSALL WITH MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 4, 6, 15-16 (1991); GILENS, supra note 20,
at 3; JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 3-4 (1995).
37. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790,
794 (2007); Derrick Z. Jackson, Op-Ed., Black 'Saints' Cannot Deliver Whites From Racial
Inertia, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2006, at All (arguing that "'taxes' is a code word for saying

that collectively, white America has no intention of really paying for quality schools").
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person was not "doing enough" (47% v. 44%).38 Moreover, not
everyone is anti-tax all the time. In one 2007 poll, 36% of respondents
believed that the next president should increase taxes on "the most
affluent Americans to help reduce the federal deficit and to pay for
expanding health care programs to cover the uninsured," while only a
bare majority (51%) preferred to cut taxes. 39 In another 2007 poll, 60%
of respondents were willing to repeal some of Bush's tax cuts to help
40
fund health insurance for all Americans.
Empirical and theoretical literature shows that the manner in which
an issue is presented or "framed" influences a person's attitudes and
perceptions. Framing can either activate (crowd in) or suppress (crowd
out) particular norms, schemas, or views. For example, whether 4 a1
charge is labeled a "tax" or a "fee" influences people's response to it.
People respond more positively to a charge that is called a fee as
opposed to a tax, 42 presumably because the term "fee" does not activate
an anti-tax schema.
Taxes naturally highlight pecuniary motives and self-interested
behavior because they involve giving money to the government. This is
especially true when, as in the United States, tradition emphasizes the
negative of taxes (taking your money away) but rarely discusses the
positive (what taxes can do for you). Consequently, the placement of
welfare provisions in the tax system activates self-interested norms and
crowds out norms which support helping others or providing
goods/services to everyone. Some in the environmental field, for
example, argue that subsidies crowd out normative behaviors such as
cooperation and altruism. 4 3 Thus, setting a price or giving an economic
38. Nine percent either didn't know or refused to answer. Kaiser Family Foundation Poll
(question 26), Oct. 2005.
39. NBC News/Wall Street Journal, GOP Primary Voters Survey, Sept. 2007, at 5, available
at http:l/msnbcmedia.msn.comlilmsnbc/sectionslnewsl071003_NBC-WSJ-Full.pdf (32% favored
a tax increase; 60% cutting taxes, and 8% were not sure).
40. Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll, supra note 26, at I I (finding that 58% of men and
63% of women were willing). Unlike the previous question, repealing the tax cuts would
increase taxes on everyone, including the respondent (if he or she paid income tax), not just the
affluent.
41. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The PoliticalPsychology of Redistribution, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1760 (2005).
42. Id. This is not true, however, in regards to existing services that are funded by a general
tax. Id. In that situation, respondents do not prefer a fee because they perceive it as paying for a
service/good that they are already getting for "free." Id.
43. E.g., Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 407, 432-33 (2006) (arguing that subsidies put a price
on environmental behavior and crowd out behavior based on responsibility). But see Ann E.
Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1297 (2001) (finding that market mechanisms
do decrease "bad" recycling behavior and increase "good" behavior).
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incentive for behavior motivated by social, non-pecuniary motives such
as reciprocity commodifies
the behavior and can actually decrease the
44
desired behavior.
Prospect theory illustrates the power of framing and is especially
relevant in the tax area. According to the theory, people respond
differently to the risk of loss and the risk of gain. In income tax, for
example, whether an issue is framed as a bonus for those with children
(such as a child credit) or a penalty for the childless will affect a
taxpayer's attitude toward the provision. 45 It also means that a taxpayer
will be more willing to take risks (not comply) when the issue is framed
as a loss (penalty from an audit) than as a gain (a bonus from a
refund) .46
Most people view taxes as a loss, in part because of an anti-tax
schema and in part because of the individualist worldview that
highlights the negatives of big government, which is associated with
taxes. 4 7 The media and politicians reinforce this by stressing the
negatives of taxation such as, "taxation takes 'your' money, gives it to
the government, which then wastes it on foolish programs or inept
bureaucracy." According to prospect theory, willingness to pay tax
should increase if paying taxes is seen as a gain rather than a loss. If a
taxpayer views his situation as interconnected with the nation's
situation, either because he is a communitarian and/or through
identification with the nation, then taxpaying is more likely to be
viewed as a gain than a loss. 48 Consequently, stressing tax-supported

44. See Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax
Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL'Y 102, 103 (2007).
45. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 41, at 1757-58.
46. For a general discussion of cognitive theory and tax compliance, see Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendationsfor the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX
REV. 599 (2007), reprinted in NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, NORMATIVE AND COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IRS REGARDING INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS 138 (2007),

available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007_vol_2.pdf.
47. The George W. Bush administration has shown that there can be tax cuts and increased
government spending that is accomplished through borrowing. Of course, eventually the debts
will have to be repaid, and ultimately that means higher taxes.
48.

See PHILLIP HANSEN, TAXING ILLUSION, TAXATION, DEMOCRACY AND EMBEDDED

POLITICAL THEORY 16 (2003) (for citizens, "the issue of what politics means and what kind of
democracy is desirable turns on a fundamental question...: To what extent can my purposes be
fulfilled only together with others; indeed to what extent are my purposes our purpose .... With
respect to taxation, this raises the question of whether taxes are charges imposed on us by remote
political authorities we are always reluctant to pay and do so only because we are coerced, or
whether they are self-imposed levies, expressions of our commitment to the wellbeing of all.").
See also Viswanath Umashanker Trivedi, Mohamed Shehata & Bernadette Lynn, Impact of
PersonalandSituationalFactors on Taxpayer Compliance: An ExperimentalAnalysis, 47 J. BUS.

270

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

programs that have been successful and/or have the approval of most
people would frame taxes as a gain.
The same holds true for welfare. Funding "poor" welfare leads to
risk-averse behavior. Such government payments help only an "other,"
and an inferior other at that, if poverty is perceived as a person's own
fault. Consequently, the non-poor will oppose welfare spending since it
is a loss to them. The perception that welfare is a loss is magnified if
welfare is delivered through the tax system because many people
already see taxes as a loss situation and it highlights the we/them aspect
of welfare that encourages viewing welfare as a loss.
Delivering welfare directly, in contrast, could encourage viewing
welfare benefits as a gain. Direct spending removes welfare from a
prominent loss context-the tax system. Of course, taxes still fund
direct expenditures, but the "loss" framing is muted and the gain (the
benefit) becomes more prominent. Moreover, direct expenditures for
health, education, and child care can encourage a broader view of
welfare as helping society, of which everyone is a part. This transforms
a welfare payment into a gain situation, either because the individual is
a direct beneficiary of the payment or indirectly because it goes to
someone in a group with which the individual associates; one of "us,"
not one of "them."
Empirical evidence illustrates how removing a policy from an
49
explicit tax context can reframe the issue and broaden support for it.
In one experiment, subjects received $18.50 Half the group was told
that $2 had been given to a charity of their choice; the other half was
told that they had been given $20 but the government had taken $2 in
taxes which was then given to the charity of their choice. 5 1 When asked
if they wanted to make additional charitable contributions, those that
had been "taxed" did not, but those subjects who had simply been told
$2 had gone to charity contributed more. 5 2 Although neither group had
a choice whether to give the initial $2, the "tax" situation highlighted
ETHICS 175, 179 (2003). One study suggests that if a taxpayer views taxes as a national
obligation, then after tax income is the taxpayer's reference point and therefore:
[T]ax compliance decisions are made in the gain domain, which leads taxpayers to
pursue risk-averse behavior. On the other hand, if the taxpayer considers paying taxes
as a loss, then his/her reference point would be their income before tax. In this case,
the taxpayer will be likely to engage in risk-seeking behavior.
Id.
49. Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Rachel M. Johnston, An Experimental Test of
the Crowding Out Hypothesis, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1543, 1556-57 (2005).
50. Id. at 1548.
51. Id. at 1548-49.
52. Id. at 1551-52.
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the compulsory aspect (or alternatively framed the situation as a loss
situation since $2 of their money had been taken from them). 53 This
54
crowded out voluntary charitable behavior.
Simply placing a policy within the tax system frames the policy
negatively, and negative framing can discourage (suppress or "crowd
out") communitarian/egalitarian views and altruistic, cooperative norms
that support poor welfare payments. Phrasing issues positively, on the
other hand, generally encourages or activates normative behavior (at
least for women). 5 5 For example, stating that most people comply with
tax laws reminds people what the norm is and encourages them to
56
follow it.
Placing welfare benefits within the tax system creates complex
framing effects that differ depending on whether the welfare is
"general" or "poor" welfare. Placing general welfare benefits in the tax
context completely reframes the benefits for most people. In contrast,
poor welfare is only partially transformed from a negative into a
positive benefit. The different outcomes result from the interaction of at
least three schema: anti-welfare, anti-tax, and anti-poor. Using the tax
system to deliver welfare reduces antipathy to the payment because the
tax system decreases the awareness of the fact that the payment is
welfare.
This occurs because people are less cognizant of tax
expenditures and understand them (and their distributive effects) less
than direct benefits. To the extent that the payment remains visible,
however, placing it within the tax system should trigger an anti-tax
schema and raise hostility towards it. This happens with poor welfare,
but not general welfare.
Using the tax system to deliver general welfare totally reframes the
payments. To the extent that people are still aware of them, their
essential nature is totally recast. They are no longer welfare (bad), but
simply a return of the individual's own money (good).
Tax
expenditures transform welfare from a negative loss frame (giving your
money to others) to a positive gain frame (getting your own money

53. Id. at 1556-57.
54. Id.
55. See Janne Chung & Viswanath Umashanker Trivedi, The Effect of Friendly Persuasion
and Gender on Tax Compliance Behavior, 47 J. BUS. ETHiCs 133, 141-44 (2003).
56. On the other hand, framing communications negatively, by emphasizing the number of
people who violate the norm, crowds out normative behavior. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini,
Descriptive Social Norms as UnderappreciatedSources of Social Control, 72 PSYCHOMETRIKA
263, 265-67 (2007). For example, theft of petrified wood at the Petrified Forest National Park
decreased when a sign with a line through it showed only one person stealing wood as opposed to
three; theft actually increased when the sign showed three people. Id.
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back). The belief that tax expenditures merely return a taxpayer's
money hides the fact that tax expenditures involve government spending
and usually are redistributive-facts
a person holding an
individualistic/hierarchic worldview would disapprove of. In short,
placing general welfare (child tax credits, home mortgage deductions,
and education credits) within the tax system frames them so positively
that they all but disappear from consciousness. Even when the benefit
is visible, the nature of the benefit (welfare) is invisible.5 7 This
explains why people support the Child Tax Credit but not Hillary
Clinton's baby bond proposal. The first is not a government spending
program but is simply returning "their" money to them. The second is a
government spending program, which violates individualistic/hierarchic
views by expanding government functions and dispensing welfare.
Although placing poor welfare in the tax system diminishes its
salience, the refraining that occurs with poor welfare tax expenditures is
not as complete as that which occurs for general expenditures. The
prominence of the welfare and redistributive aspects may fade, but they
do not disappear entirely. 58 Moreover, even if the benefits are helping
the deserving poor (e.g., those who work), the anti-poor schema still
exists. As a consequence, the seemingly greater acceptance of poor
welfare tax benefits is more apparent than real. Already the EITC is
subject to more scrutiny and concern than other tax expenditures, such
as those for higher education or mortgage interest. The law provides
harsher treatment for taxpayers who fraudulently or intentionally claim
the credit 59 than for other tax expenditures, and the IRS similarly
enforces it more strictly (e.g., higher audit rates, pre-certification efforts,
denial of benefits) even though it is unclear whether the errors are due
60
to fraud or simply confusion about a complex provision.

57. Professor Zelinsky found that people were more willing to pay volunteer firefighters by
giving them a property tax exemption than by directly giving them an equivalent amount of cash.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters,
Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797,
799 (2005). In other words, although the programs are no longer hidden in a literal sense, they
are still hidden in a cognitive sense. In the firefighter situation, people viewed cash payments as
inconsistent with the valued concept of volunteer firefighters but did not view the tax
expenditures as inconsistent because the government was not spending other taxpayers' money
but merely giving the firefighter his own money back.
58. See Ventry, supra note 4, at 1261-62; Brown, supra note 37, at 800 (EITC recipients are
seen as the "equivalent of welfare recipients").
59. I.R.C. § 32(k) (2000 & West Supp. 2008).
60. See Marsha Blumenthal, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Participationand Compliance with
the EarnedIncome Tax Credit, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 189, 210 (2005) (finding sharply higher rates of
noncompliance than estimates of noncompliance from more traditional welfare programs partially
due to different populations covered); Zelenak, supra note 29, at 1891-93; NAT'L TAXPAYER
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The larger the EITC, the more criticism will grow. 6 1 To truly affect
poverty, a refundable EITC in 2007 would have to have been raised
about $5,000 for a one-earner household (and $6,500 for a two-earner
household) to achieve the same after-tax income as increasing the
minimum wage from the then current amount of $5.15/hour to
$7.25/hour (the final increase that will occur July 24, 2009 under the
Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007).62 The EITC, although a tax
expenditure, is different from almost all other tax expenditures because
it is refundable. Consequently, the redistributive effect cannot be
completely disguised. If a recipient gets a refundable credit, he is not
simply having his own money returned, but he is getting someone else's
money. Since the recipient is poor, we call it welfare, and people
perceive welfare fraud as more serious than cheating on an income tax
form.

63

The salience of poor welfare, but not general welfare, means people
overestimate the benefits going to poor people and underestimate the
benefits they receive themselves. This biased perception can create
feelings of inequity, which are likely to be intensified because they
occur in the tax context. Anti-tax schemas cause people to dislike
paying taxes in general; the anti-tax sentiments can only be increased
when the tax is perceived as unfairly rewarding others. Taxes occur in a
monetary setting in which norms of self-interest are dominant and
feelings of economic loss prevail. They do not generally trigger
feelings of cooperation and altruism that would encourage support of
welfare.
Placing both hidden general welfare benefits and partially hidden
poor welfare benefits in the tax system creates an uneven playing field.
General welfare tax expenditures, flowing to middle and high-income
individuals, can expand silently, while poor welfare tax expenditures to
(2005), available at
101
ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/O,,id=152735,00.html (finding EITC taxpayers have "a much
higher audit rate" than other groups of individual taxpayers; forty-eight percent of individual
returns examined in fiscal year 2004 had EITC claims but only seventeen returns of all individual
returns claimed the EITC).
61. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 37, at 797.
62. Elaine Maag, Tax Credits, the Minimum Wage, and Inflation, TAX POL'Y ISSUES &
OPTIONS, Jan. 2007, at 1, 7, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311401MinimumWage.pdf. This would be costly in monetary terms and would require very high
marginal rates during the phase-out portion of the Credit, which would offset the incentive to
work at the earlier phase. For the minimum wage, see U.S. Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour
Division, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
63. Zelenak, supra note 29, at 1900. This view is not unique to Americans. Id. at 1899 (citing
survey by M.D.R. Evans & Jonathan Kelley, Are Tax Cheating and Welfare Fraud Wrong?
Public Opinion in 29 Nations, 3 AUSTL. SOC. MONITOR 93 (2001)).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

low and moderate-income individuals meet more resistance because
they are more visible. All the negative framing effects still exist and
may even be amplified because of the incorrect perception that the poor
are getting benefits, but others are not.
Delivering both general and poor welfare benefits through direct
spending instead of through the tax system can have several benefits.
First, of course, it levels the playing field in terms of visibility. If
people realize how many welfare benefits they are getting, their
animosity towards poor benefits may decrease. The distribution may
not seem so unfair. Moreover, direct expenditures may more correctly
express preferences because most people do not understand tax
expenditures and the burdens and benefits they create. For example, a
middle-income taxpayer may support an education credit not just
because it helps him but because it equally helps a low-income
individual. Distributing the benefits directly could clarify the flow of
benefits and burdens, which might change the middle-income
taxpayer's support of the program.
Direct benefits can avoid the perception of a zero-sum state that
exists in welfare tax benefits. The tax system creates an oppositional
situation. It takes "my" money and gives it to "them." Properly devised
direct expenditures, on the other hand, can activate more positive norms
of reciprocity and cooperation. Direct programs can foster a sense of
national unity and even national pride if they are seen as a means of
accomplishing American ideals such as equal opportunity.
Universal programs can frame benefits even more positively than
means-tested programs. First, they can avoid the stigma of being on
welfare, in the sense of "poor" welfare. 64 Although tax expenditures
may reduce the stigma, to the extent that the welfare is still visible, the
Similarly, in non-universal
stigma will not disappear entirely.
programs, features such as using debit cards rather than food stamps
may make welfare (nearly) invisible to the outside world. However, the
recipient may still be internally stigmatized because she knows she is
getting it. Second, universal direct programs do not divide people into
"us" and "them," that is, those who get benefits and those who do not.
Consequently, they can foster a sense of community with others and a
sense of national identity. People will be more willing to support
welfare programs because the benefits are going to the group (the
nation) that includes "us," not just "them."
64. See Carol Pogash, Free Lunch Isn't Cool, So Some Students Go Hungry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2008, at AI (illustrating how school children choose not to eat in order to hide that they are on
a subsidized food program).

2009]

Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits

275

Universal coverage can have other political advantages. Studies
show that the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden) that offer more general welfare than Anglo-American
countries not only have economic advantages, such as less poverty,
better health, and longer mortality, but also political advantages that can
improve the workings of a democracy. Their citizens have a greater
sense of community and "social solidarity," have more trust of
institutions, and "are more likely to discuss
individuals and public
65
politics with friends."
III. THE SIREN SONG OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The second common rationale for using the tax system to deliver
welfare is an economic one: tax expenditures are more efficient than
direct expenditures. 66 Although this argument appears to rest solely on
an objective criterion, in reality it ultimately rests on the same
individualistic worldview as the political justification for using tax
Economic efficiency occupies a privileged position
expenditures.
because it presumably advances American ideals of autonomy, selfreliance, and freedom. Consequently, efficiency generally prevails in a
conflict with any other goal. Since conventional thinking traditionally
posits an inevitable trade-off between equity and efficiency, any
program aimed at increasing equality, such as welfare, is disadvantaged
from the outset given the political prominence of the
individualistic/hierarchic view. Consequently, people will support a
welfare program delivered via the tax system more than a direct
spending program if it is more cost efficient.
This Part briefly investigates some of the evidence indicating that the
tax system is not as efficient a welfare delivery mechanism as
traditional wisdom believes. First, it examines the efficiency of two
important welfare tax programs: the EITC and education credits,
focusing on the former. Next, it considers the greater issue of whether
an efficiency/equity trade-off is inevitable. It concludes with a short
discussion of the efficiency of direct expenditures. It finds strong
65. NEIL BROOKS & THADDEUS HWONG, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, THE
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF TAXATION 7-8 (2006), available at

http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/National OfficePubs/2006/Benefits-andCosts-of
Taxation.pdf.
66. Economic efficiency, of course, is generally a desirable trait, but not always: society
would prefer an inefficient serial killer to an efficient one. Even in the more usual situation, when
society desires economic efficiency, devising an economically efficient policy may not be all
society needs to do. From an economic standpoint, assigning liability, for example, to either the
farmer or the rancher will be efficient, but the rule chosen will greatly affect wealth distribution.
Any point on a Pareto superior curve will be efficient.

276

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

evidence that universal, direct spending on human capital can be a very
effective way of decreasing inequality without sacrificing efficiency
(and even perhaps improving economic growth).
A. Are Tax Expenditures Efficient? Evidence from the EITC and
Education Credits
The number of tax provisions that deliver welfare benefits has
increased along with the consensus concerning their superiority over
direct spending. Today, there is a wide range of tax programs that
provide both general and poor welfare. They target a variety of areas
such as housing (e.g., low-income housing credits, home mortgage
interest deduction), children (Child Tax Credit, child care benefits),
education (Hope and Lifetime credits) and the working poor (EITC).
Many of the policy discussions focus not on the desirability of using the
tax system, but on methods to improve the tax provisions' effectiveness;
for example, by increasing the use of refundable credits and by
combining provisions to decrease confusion and duplication, as in the
case of education benefits.
This section briefly examines the basic issue of whether tax
expenditures provide welfare more efficiently than direct expenditures.
Rather than providing a comprehensive review of the vast literature, it
considers only two areas: the EITC and certain education benefits. The
EITC is the ideal provision to test the efficiency of the tax system as a
welfare delivery mechanism for a variety of reasons. First, of course, it
is the largest federal anti-poverty program for working families. 6 7 It is
also structured in the best technical form for helping the poor-a
refundable credit. Moreover, it is comprehensive in the sense that there
are not duplicative provisions, as is the case with child care, for
example. Finally, its design is compatible with conventional wisdom.
It targets the most sympathetic segment of the poor, the "deserving" or
working poor. It also encourages values congruent with the alleged
dominant worldviews, such as autonomy and responsibility, by
providing incentives that reward work.
Educational benefits also provide useful insights into conventional
wisdom. Like the EITC, they resonate with American worldviews.
They enhance individualistic norms of self-reliance and autonomy but
also appeal to egalitarians and communitarians because they strengthen
the core value of equal opportunity. At the same time, they present an
interesting contrast with the EITC because they apply, at least

67. HOLT, supra note 5, at I.
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nominally, to a much broader range of people: middle (and upper
middle or lower upper)-income taxpayers as well as low-income ones.
1. Effectiveness and Efficiency of the EITC
a. Short-Term Effectiveness
Most statistics indicate that the EITC has achieved its goal of
reducing poverty by encouraging people to work.6 8 This success,
however, has been limited not only by the current form of the credit, but
also because of problems inherent in the use of the tax system. One
inherent structural problem, for example, is the unavoidable work
disincentive created by the phase-out of the EITC. Other major
problems, such as the failure of the EITC to reach the majority of poor
people, could be solved, at least in part, by redesigning the credit. For
example, the EITC would more effectively decrease poverty if it were
more generous to childless workers or if the age requirements were
broadened to include working individuals over 65 and those below 24, a
group that includes those society ideally should be encouraging to
work. 69 However, so long as the credit is limited to the working poor, a
key political attraction because workers are "deserving" poor, many
poor people will be excluded, such as the ill, the frail, and the
completely unskilled.
The participation rate is another challenging issue. Proponents claim
that proof of the EITC's greater efficiency, vis-a-vis direct spending, is
a higher participation rate. A recent study suggests, however, that this
higher participation is true only for those who already have an
68. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-055 (Mar. 12, 2007) (statistics on individual
income taxes, split-interest trusts, and tax-exempt organizations); Earned Income Tax Credit
Outreach: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Richard J. Morgante, Commissioner, IRS Wage and Investment
Division). See also Batchelder et al., supra note 6, at 34 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2004
STATISTICS ON INCOME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 (COMPLETE

REPORT)
tbl.2.5
(2004),
available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indi/article/O,,id=
134951,00.html); HOLT, supra note 5, at 13 (arguing that the EITC has proved remarkably
successful in reducing poverty). But see Robert H. De Fina, A Comparisonof Poverty Trends
and Policy Impacts for Working Families Using Different Poverty Indexes (Fed. Reserve,
Working Paper No. 07-13, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=982393 (using certain
poverty measures there is no significant decline in poverty between 1991 and 2002 despite a
robust economy and various governmental policies attempting to reduce poverty, including
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and expansion of the EITC).
69. HOLT, supra note 5, at 8 (arguing that they fail to qualify because they are not within the
qualified age group for workers without children (25-64)); NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra
note 60, at 402 (stating that the EITC "provides little assistance to the working poor" without
children). Approximately one-third of the poor fail to qualify because they have no earnings.
HOLT, supra note 5, at 8.
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obligation to file a return; those who have no such obligation actually
may have higher participation rates in traditional direct expenditure
welfare programs.7 0 Moreover, even if the participation rate is higher, a
significant number of eligible individuals-approximately twenty to
twenty-five percent--do not claim it. 71 This is a sizeable failure-toclaim rate, especially given the very extensive, and costly, efforts to
make people aware of the credit's existence and to help them apply for
it. This intensive effort suggests that further efforts to increase
participation have little chance of success.
Costs are another problematic issue. Proponents allege the EITC is
superior because it has lower administrative costs than direct welfare.
However, a recent study suggests that the vaunted low administrative
costs are due to the fact that the credit targets households that already
must file tax returns, as opposed to those who do not. 72 Moreover, costs
to recipients, measured solely in monetary terms, are not insubstantial.
According to the IRS, in 2005, the latest year for which there is data,
EITC beneficiaries lost three million dollars of benefits due to the cost
of refund anticipation loans and commercial preparers. 7 3 Although
simplification of the credit might appear to be a solution to this
74
outsourcing, behavioral theory suggests otherwise.
A more fundamental question is whether programs that target the
poor (whether directly or through tax expenditures) are the most
effective means of fighting poverty. Some theoretical and empirical
literature suggests that this is not the case. 75 Targeting the poor has
70. Blumenthal et al., supra note 60, at 208-10.
71. Ventry, supra note 4, at 1276 (citing I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-24 (Feb. 1, 2007),
availableat http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= I 67470,00.html).
72. Blumenthal et al., supra note 60, at 210.
73. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, POLICY REPORT, HALTING THE Loss OF BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS IN EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT BENEFITS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/site/DocServer/RALReport_2008.pdfdoclD=660 1. See also
Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor
Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2006) (finding that approximately
twenty percent of low-income benefits go to commercial preparers and associated fees). A 2002
study found that in 1999, an estimated $1.75 billion of the $30 billion in EITC went to private
preparers and that this amount was growing. Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying
for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 461, 470
(2003).
74. Book, supra note 73, at 1133-34.
75. See, e.g., Martin Ravallion, How Relevant is Targeting to the Success of an Antipoverty
Program?3, 18 (World Bank - Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4385,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029500 (questioning whether a broad antipoverty
measure will effectively impact overall poverty). See also ROBERT GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL
WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999) (finding that the Dutch social welfare system, which
is not needs-based, is better at reducing poverty while producing economic growth). But see
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several flaws from an efficiency standpoint, including leaving more
poverty than universal programs. 76 As noted in the discussion of the
EITC, targeting can cause economic disincentives to work as the aid
phases out when income rises. Targeting also involves administrative
costs because rules must be devised to prevent the non-poor from
receiving the aid, either unintentionally or intentionally on account of
fraud.
Targeting entails costs to the participants as well. There are hidden
costs in terms of social stigma, but there are also real costs. The
complexity of targeting means that many individuals need help in
obtaining benefits. In the case of the EITC, participants frequently
require help filing forms, and this help often costs money, which
decreases the net amount of the benefit he or she actually receives.
Moreover, some individuals are gulled by merchants who sell them
goods based on the expectation of an EITC refund. The merchant fills
out the form, applying for an inflated amount which the consumer never
receives. Nevertheless, the consumer remains liable for the full
(inflated) price of the merchant's product, such as furniture. The
requirement that the recipient work also imposes costs on the recipient
that reduce the overall benefits (increased costs of transportation,
clothing, child care, etc.). 7 7 Children may also suffer to the extent that
their psychological, social, and educational development may be
impeded by poor quality child care and the lack of a parent at home.
Society may also incur a loss because problems for the child may spill
over and affect the wider community.
Finally, the basic premise of the EITC-that work can raise an
individual out of poverty-is not universally true. The problem extends
beyond the fundamental fact that some people are not capable of
working because of poor health or old age, for example. The work
solution to poverty assumes that there are jobs available and that those
jobs pay a "living wage." Both assumptions are not always true. Some
people want to work but cannot find a job, especially in a troubled
economy. Even if a person wants a job and the job exists, the individual

NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMING THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER OF PUBLIC

RESPONSIBILITY 135-53 (2004) (cautioning that "universal" benefits may be narrowed by taxing
them). The EITC also creates costs to the beneficiaries as well as to taxpayers. See infra note 77.
76. See HOLT, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing federal EITC administration).
77. Neeraj Kaushal, Qin Gao & Jan Waldfogel, Welfare Reform and Family Expenditures:
How are Single Mothers Adapting to the New Welfare and Work Regime? 24 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12624, 2006), available at www.nber.org/papers/w12624
(finding that welfare reform requiring work merely shifted expenditure patterns to those that

"facilitated" work).
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may be unable to obtain it because of insurmountable obstacles such as
no available transportation or child care.
More fundamentally, even if a person works full time, his labor is not
always sufficient to raise him and his family out of poverty or provide a
comfortable living. A recent study found that twenty-five percent of
families with a full-time (1800 hours) worker were still below the
poverty line. 78 Fifty-nine percent of low-income families (defined as
79
double the poverty amount) had at least one adult working full time.
Moreover, even if all 'prime-age adults' worked at least 2,000
hours/year, only about twenty percent of low-income families would
80
increase incomes above two hundred percent of the poverty level.
Even families who manage to obtain this level of income, however, still
suffer "considerable material deprivation." 8 1 Moreover, it is not clear
that increased income generated through work (as required by the
EITC) actually increases quality of life. A 2006 study, for example,
found that in households headed by low-educated single mothers, the
welfare-related social policy changes in the 1990s did not increase total
expenditures or increase changes in expenditures on child care or
learning and enrichment, but they did increase spending on
transportation, prepared meals, and other goods and services that made
82
working outside the home easier.
Hard work, in short, frequently fails to produce a reasonable standard
of living. Either work-related expenses (such as transportation and
clothing) cost enough to decrease the standard of living, and/or wages
are simply inadequate to provide a sufficient return. The inability of
work to provide a decent standard of living is a tragedy not just for the
individual, but for American society. The central tenets of American
beliefs are premised on the power of work. Individual effort leads not
only to autonomy, but offers possibility of improvement. If people
cannot support themselves by working, then American democratic

78.

GREGORY Acs & PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN INST., WHO ARE Low-INCOME WORKING

FAMILIES?
2-3
(2005),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311242working-families.pdf. The 2008 poverty level for a family of four in the continental United
States is $21,200. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 3971, 3971-72
(Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Poverty Guidelines], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
POVERTY/08fedreg.htm.
79. Poverty Guidelines, supra note 78. The median national gross family income in 2008 is
$61,500. Rev. Proc. 2008-19, § 3.01, 2008-11 I.R.B. A family with income double the poverty
guidelines would still be only approximately two-thirds of the median.
80. Acs & LOPREST, supra note 78, at 3.
81. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 6.
82. Kaushal et al., supra 77, at 24.
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ideals of self-reliance, social mobility, and equal opportunity are
seriously undermined.
b. The EITC Fails to Address Short- and Long-Term Problems of
Poverty
Although the EITC has lifted some families out of poverty, it cannot
by itself provide a solid basis for a person's long-term prosperity.
Reformulating its exact requirements can improve it, but it remains
fundamentally flawed. Its work-oriented solution to poverty has at least
three other major problems, other than those previously mentioned.
First, if the recipient is a single mother, the work requirement results
in children being placed in child care and removes them from their
mother's influence-something the federal government seems to think
is good for middle-class children. Perhaps this removal is viewed
positively because of a belief that low-income and/or low-educated
women cannot provide appropriate care. If that is the case, then simply
removing the mother from the home environment for a large part of the
day is not enough. Even if there is quality child care, a more long-term
solution to the alleged problem of inadequate parenting would include
improving the mother's parenting skills so that she can provide a more
enriching environment. Yet this rationale is also flawed because most
mothers, even if they lack middle-class characteristics, provide
nurturing and other intangible benefits for their children, such as a sense
of security. Perhaps it is believed that the income gained from work
more than compensates for any loss of maternal benefits. Even if this
were true, the rationale assumes that jobs are more than temporary and
that they provide a firm foundation for future economic solvency. Both
assumptions are questionable. Jobs for low-skilled workers do not
always pay a living wage, and even if they do, they are the most
vulnerable, especially in an economic downturn as currently exists.
The second problem with the EITC is that all it can deliver is money,
and money cannot be the sole solution to poverty. It is neither the only
incentive to work nor the only thing a poor person needs to escape
poverty. Money is certainly an important (and often primary) reason
people work, but the decision to work is also based on non-fiscal
considerations that are both personal and societal. People are internally
motivated to work by factors such as personal satisfaction and growth,
status, and a desire for social interaction. Internal motivations are
affected by external factors, such as encouragement by (and expectation
of) others, especially family and friends, or the availability of child care.
Work, by itself, cannot always provide everything a poor person
needs to escape poverty, regardless of whether the poverty is short term
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or long term. Sometimes the most effective aid is not cash but goods
and services such as food, health care, or social services. 83 Even if
money Could solve the problem (e.g., to obtain food or medicine), the
tax system cannot deliver it in a timely fashion. Although there is a
provision for advanced EITC payments, few individuals use it, largely
because of fear of having to repay. A mere 0.2% of the total amount
84
refunded by the EITC in 2003 was in the form of advanced payments.
Even if people get the cash in a timely manner, there is no guarantee
that they will use it to obtain the appropriate goods or services. While
"earmarking" cash grants increases the likelihood that the money will
be spent for the desired purpose (child care, medicine, etc.), 85 the only
way to ensure that the money is spent that way is to provide the
service/good directly. If poverty is chronic, there is even more need for
non-cash goods and services to break the cycle for parents and children.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the EITC, as with other programs
that require the recipient to work, is that it does little, if anything, to
address long-term structural issues of the availability of decent jobs at
decent wages and the social and economic policies that encourage the
development of human capital necessary to work. 86
Although
knowledge, skills, and work habits often are learned on the job, such
acquisition occurs less at lower-paid, unskilled jobs, especially if they
are temporary jobs-which are frequently the only type of job many
EITC participants can obtain. A work requirement without delivering
education does little to increase a recipient's capacity to earn. The
EITC, however, by stressing work over education, can actually
discourage the development of human capital. The beneficiary must
take a job, even if it is a dead-end job with no chance of advancement
but a high likelihood of being laid off when an economic downturn
occurs. 8 7 Although in theory the recipient could get on-the job-training
83.
84.

SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY 152 (1997).
HOLT, supra note 5.

85. This "mental accounting," or tying the payment to a purpose, may be the reason that
welfare reforms in the United Kingdom, according to one study, did increase spending on
children. ACS & LOPREST, supra note 78, at 26 (also noting that the different result in the UK
could also be due to the fact that the UK did not require work, as in the United States).
86. See ALICE O'CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND
THE POOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. HISTORY 286-92 (2001) (discussing the societal and
political pressures on welfare reform during the Clinton administration).
87. See HANDLER, supra note 36. Emphasis on work as a precondition of welfare-via direct
or tax expenditures--can be shortsighted in terms of the ultimate goal: permanent jobs. Deborah
Solomon, For Welfare Clients, Temporary Jobs Can Be a Roadblock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
2006, at Al (citing study finding that in Michigan, almost half of recipients who exit the welfare
system boomerang back within three months). The work requirement "can create an unyielding
cycle of finding and losing jobs," divert time and effort from finding a permanent job, and
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or take adult education courses, the former often has limited
transferability and the latter is frequently infeasible given other
responsibilities and constraints on the worker (no transportation, child
care duties, etc.). There is some evidence that work requirements
actually negatively affect the recipient, resulting in a "deterioration in
the quality of employment" while increasing the portion of the economy
88
that takes advantage of the poor (e.g., "payday" lenders).
Although the tax system cannot deliver education and skills training
necessary to create human capital, it can encourage it-at least in
theory. As the next section illustrates, however, delivering on that
promise is difficult.
2. Education
Education can enrich anyone's life, both monetarily and spiritually,
but for the poor it can be a key to escaping poverty. Education also has
positive externalities that benefit society as a whole, not just the
individual receiving the education. 89 Consequently, the United States
federal government has a long history of subsidizing education at all
levels through direct expenditures (e.g., land grant colleges, No Child
Left Behind) 90 and through the tax system (e.g., non-profit status,
charitable contributions to educational institutions). 9 1
Today,
educational tax benefits that go directly to individuals (as opposed to
institutions) occur mainly at the post-secondary level. 92 These tax
psychologically damage recipients every time they are laid off one job because the recipient
spends time looking for jobs. Id.
88. Terry Carney, Traveling the 'Work-First' Road to Welfare Reform, 44 JUST POL'Y - A
JOURNAL OF AUSTL. SOC. POL'Y 12 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080109
(discussing how different poverty indices show different results).
89. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
TAX EXEMPTIONS AND INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 29-30 (Comm. Print 2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-49-06.pdf.
90. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/edu.pdf (funding budget for U.S. Department of Education).
91. The literature on tax incentives and education is vast, and well beyond the scope of this
Article, which provides only a cursory examination of the topic. Among the numerous articles on
the topic are: Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Benefits for ligher Education: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th
Cong. (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-35-08.pdf; Andrew D. Pike, No
Wealthy Parent Left Behind: An Analysis of Tax Subsidies for Higher Education, 56 AM. U. L.
Rev. 1229 (2007); Sean M. Stegmaier, Tax Incentives for Higher Education in the Internal
Revenue Code: Education Tax Expenditure Reform and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits,
37 Sw. U. L. REV. 135 (2008).
92. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
EXPENSES (2005) (trends in government subsidies for education); see also LEONARD E. BURMAN
ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR
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benefits represent an increasing proportion of federal dollars spent on
higher education while direct benefits, such as Pell grants, have been
93
decreasing.
Experts agree that current education tax incentives have many
problems, including three major issues. First, educational tax benefits
are not very effective at increasing college enrollment; in fact, evidence
suggests that enrollment is more responsive to grants. 94 A second major
problem is a distributional one: tax incentives primarily benefit students
in middle and upper-middle income families; low-income families
receive few, if any, benefits from these tax expenditures. 95 This is in
contrast to direct grants under the Pell program, which target lowincome families. 96
Since low-income students are significantly
underrepresented in higher education, especially four-year academic
institutions, 97 assisting this group would provide both individual and
social benefits.
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE INTERSECTION OF TAX AND SPENDING PROGRAMS (2005), available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311210_TPCDiscussionPaper-26.pdf (analyzing the
shift in subsidizing education through the tax code rather than through direct expenditures).
93. See Pike, supra note 9 1, at 1245 (noting that tax provisions constitute an increasingly large
portion of the federal financial aid effort).
94. BURMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 13-14. But see Susan M. Dynarski & Judith E. ScottClayton, Complexity and Targeting in Federal Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis 22 (Tax
Policy & the Economy, Working Paper No. RWP08-005, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1083721 (arguing there is little persuasive evidence that Pell Grants
increase enrollments).
95. Most benefits go to those with incomes of at least $50,000. See, e.g., TAX POLICY CTR.,
EDUCATION
TAX
INCENTIVES,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Education-TaxIncentives.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2008) (reporting that few low-income families benefit from
education credits). It is not surprising that tax credits do not help poorer families, since thirty-five
percent of households have no tax liability; therefore, a credit cannot help them. For this reason,
some scholars suggest that the education credits become refundable. See, e.g., BURMAN ET AL.,
supra note 92, at 12 (discussing the benefits of making College Opportunity Tax Credit
refundable). This solution, however, is limited. First, and perhaps the crucial concern, is the
expense of a refundable credit. Also, note that there is some evidence that schools often increase
tuition because of a credit, or at least decrease loans. Id. at 14. Moreover, just as with the EITC,
not all eligible taxpayers claim the credits. Burman found that seventy-four percent use the Hope
Credit, and only sixty-three percent use the Lifetime Credit, with usage increasing with income.
Id at 31.
96. A 2005 Urban Institute study estimated that approximately 40% of Pell grants were
distributed to tax units with AGI < $10,000, 60% to students from tax units with AGI < $20,000,
and only 2% to those with AGI > $50,000. Batchelder et al., supra note 6, at vi. In contrast, the
study found that only 4.1% of the Hope Credit went to students in tax units with "cash income of
less than $20,000" (approximately the poverty line for a family of 4), and 60% to those with
income greater than $50,000. Id. In 2005, median income was $46,326. See CASHELL, supra
note 35, at 6. More than half of the benefits go to those between $50,000-$100,000. Batchelder
et al., supra note 6, at vi. Median income in 2005 was $46,326, if middle class were defined to
include the 4th quintiles which, according to the United States Census, reached $91,705.
97. Controlling for ability measured by tests (a dubious marker), the gap in higher education
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Third, educational tax benefits are very complicated and confusing.
An individual must determine what the benefits are, whether he or she
qualifies, and then how to obtain them. Often the planning must be
done many years in advance of the benefit (education savings plans, for
example).
This often contrasts with direct benefits, where the
institutions that administer the programs provide expert assistance.
Such complexity helps explain why many people who qualify do not
98
take advantage of the benefits.
Another basic problem with current educational tax benefits is their
focus on higher education. This puts the cart before the horse since
many students begin to flounder while attending inadequate primary
schools and do not even finish high school. The ramifications of these
earlier failures are tremendous, not just to the individual but to society.
From an individual standpoint, those without a high school education
make less money than high school graduates and have fewer life
opportunities to develop their talents and interests. From a societal
perspective, dropouts are more likely to be poor, unemployed, in poor
health, in prison, and in need of welfare. 99 Those who do not finish
high school are more likely to be a minority than those who do finish. 100
Those who finish in four years are more likely to be higher-income
white students than minorities. For example, in Boston, 40% of all
students took greater than four years to graduate, with 52% of black
between low and top quartile is 22%.
Also, low and moderate income students are
"disproportionately" enrolled in two-year schools and "even more heavily in short-term programs
in for-profit and technical schools." Batchelder et al., supra note 6, at v; Pike, supra note 91, at
1256.
98. See Higher Education: Multiple Higher Education Tax Incentives Create Opportunities
for Taxpayers to Make Costly Mistakes: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures,
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 10-11 (May 1, 2008) (testimony of Michael
Brostok, Director, Tax Issues, Government Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08717t.pdf (suggesting that many tax filers do not make optimal
education-related tax decisions due to the complexities of the tax provisions).
99. The median income of high school dropouts age eighteen and over was $12,184 in 2003.
INST. OF EDUC. SCIENCE, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., DROPOUT RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002
AND 2003, at 1 (2006), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006062.pdf. By comparison, the median
income of those age eighteen and over who completed their education with a high school
credential (including a General Educational Development (GED) certificate) was $20,431. Id.
Thirty percent of federal inmates are dropouts along with forty percent of state inmates and fifty
percent of death row inmates. A study of British Columbia suggests that ensuring that children of
welfare recipients graduate from high school will decrease the children's use of welfare. Michael
B. Coelli, David A. Green & William P. Warburton, Breaking the Cycle? The Effect of Education
on Welfare Receipt Among Children of Welfare Recipients, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1369 (2007).
100. Coelli et al., supra note 99, at 1369, tbl.9-A. 2003 completion rates, and number and
distribution of completers ages 18-24 not currently enrolled in high school or below, by selected
background characteristics: White (non-Hispanic): 91.9%; Black (non-Hispanic) 85.1%; Hispanic
69.2%; Asian/Pacific Islander: 93.9%; more than one race: 91.7%. Id.
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males and 57% of Hispanic males not graduating on time, but in the
suburb of Weston, only 1% of
wealthier, predominantly white Boston
10 1
time.
on
graduate
to
all males failed
Some of the problems with current educational tax benefits are
correctable, or at least can be improved, and many have offered
For example, decreasing the number of provisions
suggestions.
providing benefits would significantly alleviate both complexity and
confusion. Extending benefits to primary and secondary education
would deliver assistance at critical levels of education. Similarly,
making credits refundable would improve distributional effects.
Nevertheless, delivering education benefits through the tax system,
like delivering welfare benefits via the EITC, has problems that are
intrinsic to tax expenditures. For example, there is a timing problem
that may prevent some taxpayers from taking advantage of the tax
benefits. Taxpayers must pay the educational expense before they
receive the tax benefit, and they may not have the money to do so. This
is a problem with any tax-delivered benefit when the person needs the
good or service immediately but must wait to get the money to pay for
it. EITC data shows that even when the benefit is theoretically available
earlier in the form of an advance payment, few take advantage of
applying for the money. This failure to use advances may reflect fear of
having to repay incorrectly received money, or it may simply reflect
lack of awareness of the advanced payment, or an inability to deal with
its complexity.
Cognitive theory also indicates, as previously discussed, that
providing education benefits through the tax system creates framing
issues. Tax benefits encourage an entitlement attitude (the very
problem commonly associated with the "old-style" direct welfare)
because the beneficiary does not usually even believe that he or she is
getting anything from the government. The benefit is invisible because
the taxpayer believes he or she is entitled to it since the provision
merely returns his or her money to him.
Tax expenditures also can be a band-aid solution, diverting attention
For
from bigger underlying structural problems with education.
example, the temporary section 62(a)(2)(D) $250 above-the-line
deduction for elementary and secondary teachers for supplies is no
substitute for schools providing adequate supplies. Moreover, nowhere
do any of these benefits address unequal school achievements and high

101. Steve Bailey, Two Bostons, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2007 at FI (citing Northeastern
University Center for Labor Market Studies).
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school graduation and college rates among differing demographic
groups.
Increasingly, evidence shows the importance not only of high school
but of early, preschool education to the individual and to society. Some
believe it is one of the three best ways to improve the economy. Much
evidence suggests that given the importance of the early childhood
Universal
years, mere access to good child care is inadequate.
preschool education could provide substantial, long-lasting benefits that
far exceed their costs. A 2006 study concluded that a "high-quality
universal preschool policy" (for all three-year-old and four-year-old
children) would improve economic growth and "could add $2 trillion to
annual U.S. GDP by 2080" at a cost of only $59 billion. 10 2 In recent
testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor, Ron
Haskins, a former White House and congressional advisor who helped
shape the 1996 welfare reforms, stated, "Reducing the achievement gap
holds great promise for reducing poverty in the long term and even for
reducing inequality . . . there is no body of evidence on any social
wide a range of
intervention that holds as much promise of producing10 as
3
programs."'
preschool
high-quality
as
effects
positive
B. Equity v. Efficiency Tradeoff
The classic belief that there is an inevitable tradeoff between equity
and efficiency has begun to crumble under the weight of recent
evidence. Numerous studies have found little support for the view that
expanded welfare programs inhibit the economy. Peter Lindert's two
volume historical study of "social" spending, for example, found "[t]he
102. ISABEL SAWHILL, WILLIAM T. DICKENS & JEFFREY TEBBS, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
POLICY BRIEF SERIES 153, THE EFFECTS OF INVESTING IN EARLY EDUCATION ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1, 3 (2006). See also JULIA B. ISAACS, THE BROOKINGS INST., COST-EFFECTIVE

INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN (2007) ("[E]ven in a time of fiscal austerity ... America's future
economic well-being will benefit from targeting investments to ensure that children have the
skills to become tomorrow's adult workers, caregivers, taxpayers, and citizens."). Isaacs's
proposed investments include (1) "high quality" educational programs for three-year-olds and
four-year-olds, (2) "nurse home-visiting programs to promote sound prenatal care and the healthy
development of infants and toddlers," (3) an emphasis on programs in high-poverty elementary
schools, and 4) teen pregnancy reduction programs that "provide structured learning and
volunteer opportunities." Id. at 1.
103. Investing in Early Education: Paths to Improving Children's Success: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, I 10th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Ron Haskins, Senior
Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/Files/rc/testimonies/2008/0123_education haskins/0123education haskins.pdf (Haskins
Brookings
Center
on
Children
and
Families,
now
co-directs
the
http://www.brookings.edu/expertshi/haskinsr.aspx). Accord Jens Ludwig & Deborah A. Phillips,
The Benefits and Costs of Head Start (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12973,2007).
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net national costs of social transfers, and of the taxes that finance them,
are essentially zero." 10 4 His research determined that high welfare
countries spend more on programs that improve the economy by
developing peoples' human capital, such as public education. 10 5 Even
more interestingly, some researchers have found that inequality itself,
especially extreme inequality, has numerous negative effects. It creates
barriers to economic growth, undermines political stability, and
decreases the health and happiness of people. 10 6 Inequality that results
in absolute poverty is especially pernicious, but even relative povertywhich results from wealth/income inequality-is injurious.' 0 7 As a
recent comparative study stated:
Inequalities erode social cohesion; they lead to worse health and
personal security outcomes; they lead to the withdrawal of the haves
from the life of the community and the exclusion of the have-nots;
and, generally, inequality diminishes the richness and flourishing of a
society. Moreover, extreme levels of inequality have been shown to
have a negative impact on economic growth by distorting the
allocation of resources and talents. Income inequality has also been
shown to destabilize political and social values, since disproportionate

104. PETER H. LINDERT, I GROWING PUBLIC-SOCIAL SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 21 (2004) [hereinafter LINDERT 1]; PETER H. LINDERT, 2
GROWING PUBLIC-SOCIAL SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY 82-99 (2004).
105. LINDERT I, supra note 104, at 32.
106. See id. at 259; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, POVERTY IN AMERICA, GAO-07-344 (2007) (finding that individuals living in poverty

face increased risk of poor health and criminal activity, leading to reduced participation in the
labor market); BROOKS & HWONG, supra note 65. See also McAdams, supra note 2, at 28.
There can be a variety of explanations for the disutility of inequality. The 2008 tax rebates
indicate one economic problem of large inequality: an inability of much of the population to buy
the goods being produced. Henry Ford recognized this also when he increased the salaries of his
factory workers so they would have enough money to buy the cars they produced. The economist
John Kenneth Galbraith suggested, "We will discover that efficiency improves when a larger
number of people feel they have a fair shot at being middle class .... We will find that people
work harder under these conditions, that they are happier, that families are more stable, and that
patterns of investment, consumption, and even technological change will accommodate
themselves to more equality in the nation at large." JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL:
THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 266 (1998). Even if some inequality is necessary for economic

growth, it is questionable whether the current disparities are necessary. See Lester C. Thurow,
Toward a Definition of Economic Justice, 31 PUB. INT. 56, 77 (1973) ("[C]urrent inequalities are

much larger than those necessary to produce and expand the current gross national product.").
The literature on the problems of inequality from political and social perspectives as well as
economic ones is large. See, e.g., infra Parts II, III (discussing welfare delivery mechanisms and
ways to promote economic efficiency).
107. On the importance of relative inequality as opposed to absolute inequality, see AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and

Happiness,45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2004).
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to increased influence over political
economic power invariably leads
10 8
and other societal decisions.
In sum, the classic assumption that equity can be achieved only at the
expense of efficiency is not simply wrong, it is backwards, at least
according to increasing evidence. Greater economic growth can be
achieved with greater equity. Equality and efficiency are partners, not
adversaries.
C. DirectExpenditures
Properly devised direct expenditures can provide some economic and
political advantages compared to tax expenditures, while avoiding
several of the previously discussed disadvantages. For example, direct
expenditures can provide more timely aid, in contrast to the time lag
noted for both the EITC and education credits. Even when timely aid is
theoretically available from a tax credit, as in advance tax credits, the
EITC experience shows that few take advantage of it. Moreover,
providing periodic aid through the tax system can be complex (and
costly) as the United Kingdom experience indicates. 10 9 More timely aid
has at least two advantages. First, more people may take advantage of it
since people will not discount the value of the future benefit nor overemphasize the disadvantage of applying for an advance credit. Second,
timelier aid can be more efficient; if you need money now, getting it
two months, or a year, from now is not terribly helpful.
In certain situations, direct benefits may present fewer opportunities
for fraud than tax benefits. Since there is no natural quantitative limit to
how much money people want, people have a great incentive to lie to
get more money than they rightly deserve through a tax expenditure.
The same incentive to cheat may arise with some direct benefits. For
example, some people may lie to get undeserved free cheese, not to
consume it themselves, but to sell it. There is little incentive to cheat,
however, if the direct benefits are not transferable and are not the type
one would be likely to over-consume. Many important direct welfare
benefits are of this nature, such as education and medicine. People, for
example, are unlikely to repeat a grade in a tuition-free school or to ask
the doctor for two free shots instead of one.
108.

BROOKS & HWONG, supra note 65, at 16.

109. The UK provides a weekly or monthly child tax credit payment. See HM Revenue &
Customs, Children, Childcare and Tax Credits, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxcredits/childrenchildcare.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). See also Jennifer Hill, Tax Credit Blunders Cost a
Billion per Year, REUTERS NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, http://uk.reuters.comarticlePrint?articleld=
UKL0421384920080205 (administrative costs rose to 587 million pounds in 2006/2007, from
406 million pounds three years earlier, but the report stated the "situation is as serious as ever").
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Direct expenditures also can be more effective than tax expenditures
because the former can provide a variety of types of aid, not just money,
which is all the latter can do. Sometimes the help needed most is not
money, but advice, emotional support, or immediate physical assistance.
Even if money can buy a good or service, handing out money is not
always the most efficient means to obtain it. Delivering money rather
than the good/service itself is not as quick. Moreover, delivering money
can present more hurdles for the recipient: figuring out what to buy,
where to buy it, how to get to the place that sells it, and so forth. Giving
vaccinations, for example, is more efficient than handing out money to
go and get a vaccination. More importantly, some of the most effective
welfare tools are not money but investments in human capitaleducation, health, skills training. Again, money can eventually buy
some of these, but the time lag between getting the money and the
assistance is greater, and the real world hurdles for the recipient may be
too high.
Some universal direct benefits can be economically efficient,
possibly more so than targeted programs. A universal program may
have fewer administrative costs, less complexity, and less fraud, since
fewer rules are needed to determine eligibility and fewer people are
excluded. A longitudinal study indicated that universal programs in the
Netherlands during the mid-eighties and nineties were more effective at
reducing poverty than targeted programs in the United States and also
produced economic growth. 110 High tax/high welfare countries have
often achieved greater social equality than low tax/low welfare
countries without sacrificing economic growth or "material
prosperity." 1 ' High tax/high welfare Scandinavian countries have
less poverty in almost all social groups, better health and longer
mortality, higher amount of university education; better gender
equality, lower homicide rates ..., more freedom, according to a
widely referred to index of economic freedom.... a marginally higher
GDP per capita; a higher GDP per hour worked, significantly lower
unit labour costs and significantly lower rates of inflation, higher
budget and current account surpluses, a higher total labour
participation rate, and higher female labour participation rate, much
higher rates of household saving and net national saving. 112

110. GOODIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 261-62. See also Ravallion, supra note 75, at 18 (poor
correlation between targeting and cost effectiveness-i.e., reduction in poverty relative to cost of
program).
I1I. BROOKS & HWONG, supra note 65, at 10.
112. id.at 7-8.
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IV. CONCLUSION: REFRAMING WELFARE SPENDING

The belief that tax expenditures are more economically efficient and
more politically palatable than direct expenditures has produced a
welfare policy that relies too heavily on tax expenditures. As a
consequence, current policy not only fails to provide the maximum
economic benefits possible but also fails to achieve the greatest amount
of public support. A better mix of direct and indirect spending can
improve both. In particular, there should be more direct spending,
especially universal direct spending, to improve human capital. Such
spending is economically efficient because it attacks the root causes of
poverty. It is also politically efficient because it cognitively frames the
policies in a manner that appeals to both individualistic/hierarchicists
and communitarian/egalitarians. Such programs focus on equal
opportunity,
a
concept
common
to
all
worldviews.
Individualistic/hierarchicists need equal opportunity because without it
the self cannot be fully expressed and any distribution based on merit is
hollow; communitarian/egalitarians also need equal opportunity to
achieve their vision of a just society. A policy that focuses on equal
opportunity can expand support for redistribution by uniting people
through a sense of a common goal and create a community of interests
which activates norms of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity.
Placing welfare in the tax system frames the policy negatively. It
creates a zero-sum situation in which "my" money is given to "them."
In contrast, providing welfare benefits directly-especially through
universal benefits-can reframe welfare benefits into a win-win
situation. Since everyone is entitled to these benefits, everyone has a
stake in them. This helps ensure political support (Social Security being
the classic example). Since coverage is not needs-based, the programs
do not divide the population into "us" and "them" taxpayers and taxtakers, as welfare payments do.
Direct benefits can also diminish a sense of "us" and "them" by
lessening the incorrect perception that the poor receive an unduly large
amount of welfare. The non-poor receive most of their welfare from tax
expenditures, which are all but invisible. To the extent they are visible,
people do not see them as government spending or welfare, but as a
return of their money. In contrast, government spending for the poor is
visible regardless of whether it is delivered through direct spending or
through the tax system. Direct spending can help level the playing field
for welfare benefits by making general welfare more transparent. If
people realize how many welfare benefits they are getting, their
animosity towards poor benefits may decrease. The distribution may
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not seem so unfair. Moreover, direct expenditures may more correctly
express preferences since most people do not understand tax
expenditures and the burdens and benefits they create. For example, a
middle-income taxpayer may support an education credit not only
because it helps him, but because it equally helps a low-income
individual. Distributing the benefits directly could clarify the flow of
benefits and burdens, which might change the middle-income
taxpayer's support of the program.
Direct spending for human capital formation allows the spending to
be reframed entirely. It eliminates the negative frame of "welfare." It
presents the programs positively in terms of creating equality of
opportunity for everyone, a concept that bridges opposing worldviews.
Moreover, universal direct spending eliminates the we/them division
because everyone is entitled to the same benefits. Many people have
noted the advantages-economic, social, and political-of direct
universal programs for health, child care, and preschool education, for
13
example.'
Emphasis on using the tax system to deliver welfare benefits has led
to a suboptimal allocation of public monies to fight poverty and increase
everyone's welfare. It has led to missed opportunities for direct
spending programs, such as preschool education programs, that could
garner popular support and also provide the foundation for both
decreasing inequality and increasing economic growth.
A more
balanced mixture of tax and direct spending could garner more political
support and more efficiently decrease poverty and inequality while
increasing economic growth and nurturing democratic goals, such as
participation.
This Article concludes with brief descriptions of two programs that
build on existing efforts to improve welfare. A novel feature of both
programs is that each involves direct and indirect (tax) spending. The
first offers an alternative to the EITC's pure tax efforts to make "work
pay;" the second provides a mixed approach to higher education
spending.

113. Scandinavian countries, with their higher level of welfare benefits, outperform AngloAmerican countries in a number of social and political categories such as "community and social
solidarity ... general happiness ... trust among individuals and for public institutions," and more
leisure time. BROOKS & HWONG, supra note 65, at 8. Individuals in those countries "have more
freedom, according to a widely referred to index of economic freedom; individuals report more
life satisfaction; and they are more likely to discuss politics with friends." Id.
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A. Making Work Pay
Policies that encourage work can generate support across the full
spectrum of worldviews and at the same time be effective economic
tools for decreasing poverty, provided they are properly devised. Tax
expenditures alone cannot achieve these goals, as Part III demonstrated.
A recent proposal combining tax and direct expenditures, however,
overcomes some of the limitations of the EITC, most notably its
inability to address the underlying causes of poverty and its inability to
provide non-monetary support that many impoverished individuals
need. The proposal is based on an experiment in Milwaukee in the
1990s called New Hope. 114 Unlike the EITC, New Hope provided
direct benefits that mere money could not. Working closely with the
"existing social service infrastructure in Milwaukee,' 115 it not only
increased the immediate monetary position of the poor (including single
individuals), it improved their long-term prospects.
Even more
encouraging was the effect on children, especially boys, in terms of
improvements in their school performance and behavior. An evaluation
two years later showed that positive effects of the program remained.
The authors found that the New Hope benefits to the participants and
society exceeded all the costs. The program suggests promising longlasting benefits to society: less crime, less school drop out, less drug
abuse, less unruly behavior; in short, a higher chance of keeping
children out of trouble and becoming productive citizens.116 This is,
indeed, a superb economic result and surely the type of program that
can gain political support from both individualistic/hierarchicists and
communitarian/egalitarians.
B. Free College Tuition
Since college-educated individuals earn far more than their less
educated cohorts, providing greater opportunities to attend college can

TO

114. HANS Bos ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., NEW HOPE: FULFILLING AMERICA'S PROMISE
"MAKE WORK PAY"
(2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/

12 work-gennetian.aspx. In 2005, there were 3.7 million households in poverty that had a fulltime worker. Id. at 5. The study was part of Brookings' Hamilton Project, which
produces research and policy proposals on how to create a growing economy that
benefits more Americans. The Hamilton Project's economic strategy reflects a
judgment that long term prosperity is best achieved by making economic growth
broad-based, by enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role for
effective government in making needed public investments.
Hamilton Project, http://www.brookings.edu/projects/hamiltonproject.aspx (last visited Oct. 26,
2008).
115. BOSET. AL., supra note ll4, at 15.
116. Id.at 22.
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lessen wealth/income inequality and at the same time increase economic
growth. Although the United States, unlike many countries, does not
provide universally free or very low-cost college education, Americans
do support government spending on education as a way to further equal
opportunity. Indeed, the American GI bill, which provided large
numbers of American males with free higher education, promoted
economic mobility and growth. State (and local) governments still
provide substantial direct benefits for college education through their
university and community college systems (and of course, provide
direct elementary and secondary education). Although the United
States government no longer maintains extensive direct college
programs, it still provides numerous college benefits, although mainly
through the tax system. In general, however, these benefits flow
primarily to the non-poor, as discussed above.
Recent developments in college financial assistance show a
promising trend that combines tax expenditures with a direct spending
program that is almost universal. A growing list of private colleges
have eliminated student loan programs and dramatically increased direct
aid so that students pay little or no tuition and sometimes even receive
free room and board. Many of these expanded financial aid programs
cover the vast majority of students. Stanford University, for example,
has announced that it will provide free tuition to students from families
earning less than $100,000, which is eighty percent of all U.S.
families. 1 17 Other schools, such as Yale University and Harvard, have
greatly increased aid to families with incomes up to $200,000.1 18 Many
other colleges, including state and community colleges, offer similar
programs.1 9 This broad-based financial aid is more politically viable

117. Households with $100,000 income were in the top quintile in 2006, and those with
$200,000 were in the top five percent. See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey,
Annual Social and Economic
Supplements, tbl.H-1
(1967-2006),
available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinchO1ar.html
(including a table modified to
reflect inflation). See also Jonathan D. Glater, Stanford Set to Raise Aid for Students in Middle,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at A14 (Stanford also waives room and board if income is less than

$60,000).
118. Harvard recently announced that it will provide students from upper middle-income
families (incomes between $120,000 and $180,000) with significant financial assistance. Eric
Konigsberg, Never Having to Say, "Too Expensive," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at Week in
Review 5. See also David Leonhardt, College and Money, What a Deal!, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2008, at Education Life 26-27 (financial aid bidding war at the nation's top universities); Valerie
Strauss, Yale Announces Plan to Cut Tuition for Many, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2008, at A02
(Yale's tuition reduction for lower income families).
119. See Emily Brandon, Better Yet, No Tuition: More Programs Offer Students Free
Schooling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.usnews.comusnews/biztech/
articles/060910/18free.htm (discussing reactions to free higher education).
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than merely aiding the poor because it unites the interests of the vast
majority of students (and their parents). 120 Although universities
offering these programs are private institutions, the programs are
actually a combination of public and private funding. Large portions of
the endowments that finance these programs come from private donors,
but the public both encourages the donations and subsidizes them in the
form of the section 170 charitable deduction for the donor and nonprofit section 503(c) tax-exempt status for the institution. Indeed, much
of the impetus for increasing financial aid results from Congressional
concern about rising tuitions at a time when these tax-favored entities
have vastly increased endowment funds but pay only a small percentage
on financial aid. 12 1 Senator Grassley recently wrote, "Those tax
exemptions involve a social compact: In exchange, colleges are obliged
to carry out the charitable purpose of providing the best education to the
12 2
most students at the lowest cost."
There is an old saying: Give a man a fish and you feed him for a
day/Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime. 123 In today's
fast-paced, rapidly changing economy, even learning how to fish cannot
ensure a lifetime of self-sufficiency. Men and women must be able to
learn how to do tasks that have not even been invented yet. They need
an infrastructure that supports the development of currently needed
skills as well as the capacity to learn future ones. They also need an
infrastructure that allows them to practice these skills. They need, for
example, not only education that gives them the skills to work, but also
affordable child care that allows them to work. Tax expenditures alone
cannot ensure that the largest number of people have the chance to
acquire and use the skills needed to live a fulfilling and productive life.
They cannot create the necessary skills and infrastructure, but even if
they could, they could not acquire sufficient political support to enact
them.
A "hybrid" approach with a better mix of direct and indirect spending
can do both. Not only can it more effectively create the necessary
capabilities, but it can also achieve broader political support by
120. Households with $100,000 income were in the top quintile in 2006, and those with
$200,000 were in the top top five percent. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 117, tbl.H-1,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/h01 ar.html.
121. See Michael Grynbaum, Keeping the Lid On, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20 2008, at Education
Life 2 (noting escalating tuition costs in higher education).
122. Charles E. Grassley, Wealthy Colleges Must Make Themselves More Affordable, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2008, available at http://chronicle.comlweekly/v54/i38/
38a03601 .htm.
123. Bartlett's Quotations, Bartleby.com, http://www.bartleby.coml73/484.html (last
visited
Oct. 16, 2008).
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appealing to Americans regardless of their worldviews. Moreover, by
activating positive norms-such as cooperation, reciprocity, and
altruism-it can further promote the accomplishment of these goals
while reinforcing support for them. Such a hybrid program can truly
help to "end welfare as we know it:" moving people from dependency
to autonomy while at the same time encouraging economic growth and
strengthening democratic ideals such as equal opportunity.

